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ABSTRACT 
Since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European Union (EU) has seemed to 
work towards a unification of foreign policy interests of all member states. However, the most 
recent case of Libya reveals that the EU is still torn when it comes to questions of foreign 
policy and especially the deployments of military troops. Within the last twenty years, a 
number of international crises have pointed out the deficiencies of the EU with regard to these 
issues. 
With this thesis, I aim to find reasons for the inability of the EU in questions of foreign 
policy, and particularly military action-taking within an EU framework. I argue that the role 
of Germany in this context is rather crucial. As the largest and most powerful member state, 
Germany’s position has a large influence on the actions of the EU. Germany has been very 
reluctant towards using military power after the horrible events in World War II (WWII), and 
hence, I pose the research question: ‘To what extent does Germany’s aversion to the use of 
military power due to historic reasons affect the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice 
on issues of security and defense?’  
My main argument is the following: ‘The inability of the EU to speak with a common voice 
with regard to military action is due to several aspects, with the largest influence being 
Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’.  
In my thesis I find that a number of reasons may influence the inability of the EU to speak 
with a common voice; however, the largest effect seems to have Germany and the country’s 
still-existing reluctance towards using military means due to its history and consequential 
guilt sentiments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The EU is an economic giant, but a political dwarf in foreign affairs” (Bickerton, 2010, p. 
214).  
This statement seems to ring true: as an economic entity (albeit not recently) the European 
Union (EU) is an important player on the world stage. However, when it comes to issues of 
foreign policy, security and defense, the EU finds it difficult to speak with a common voice.  
With this thesis I aim to find causes for this condition. It has long been common belief that the 
inability of the EU to find common ground concerning a number of policy fields, not merely 
foreign policy issues, was due to its intergovernmental structure. As I will deploy further in 
the theoretical part of this thesis, the fact that currently twenty-seven states interact in order to 
arrive at decisions that leave all actors content, renders decision-making a difficult task. 
Particularly, the issue of foreign policy-making that has traditionally been a matter to deal 
with on the national level has presented an obstacle to EU policy makers.  
However, in my thesis I find that the role Germany plays with regard to finding common 
standpoints in foreign policy and military issues in the EU is rather large. Germany is the 
most populous country as well as the largest economy in the EU (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2012). With this powerful position in socio-economic matters comes an inherent degree of 
power regarding political issues. Consequently, the EU and decision-makers within it are very 
much dependent on the position Germany takes regarding various issues, including the 
country’s standpoint on matters of foreign policy, security and defense. In cases of German 
non-participation in EU operations, it is yet possible for other actors to act either unilaterally 
or multilaterally. However, common EU decision-making becomes difficult, if not impossible 
here. One of the most recent examples for this is the case of Libya. Germany abstained from 
voting in the UN Security Council for a no-fly zone over Libya and denied to carry out any 
military action in the operation. With this behavior, Germany separated itself from its main 
European allies, France and the UK (Benitez, 2011).  
Ever since WWII, Germany has had a ‘dysfunctional’ relationship with any sort of military 
engagement. The guilt of and responsibility for the horrific Nazi regime and its atrocities has 
been influencing German foreign policy-making for decades. This goes for national decision-
making; however, with the gradual increase of the EU’s importance economically as well as 
politically comes the fact that Germany, as the largest and most powerful state of the EU, may 
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influence the foreign policy-making of the EU. Hence, the research question I pose in this 
thesis is the following: 
‘To what extent does Germany’s aversion to the use of military power due to historic reasons 
affect the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice on issues of security and defense?’ 
In order to find an answer to this question I will test the following variables. The dependent 
variable in this research is the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice with regard to 
military action. The independent variables to be analyzed here are four-fold: 
1. Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s 
history 
2. Germany’s aversion to use military power due to its role as the major financial 
contributor 
3. EU member states’ domestic policies 
4. EU’s institutional changes 
I will deploy four hypotheses, each corresponding to one of the independent variables, in 
order to determine whether my argument can be supported.  
I argue that there is not one single reason for the inability of the EU to reach common ground 
with regard to security and defense questions; in fact, I state that a number of aspects come 
together and create this situation within the EU. Hence, my central argument is: 
‘The inability of the EU to speak with a common voice with regard to military action is due to 
several aspects, with the largest influence being Germany’s aversion to use military power 
due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’.  
In my research I find that indeed this argument can be affirmed. Through my analysis, I come 
to find that the German Schuldgefühle (feelings of guilt) stemming from WWII are largely 
responsible for the fact that the EU has immense problems reaching a common standpoint on 
issues of security and defense. Especially with regard to the application of military means, 
Germany proves to be somewhat of an obstacle to the unobstructed functioning of a common 
defense policy. However, other aspects play a role as well. Germany’s role as the major 
financial contributor in the EU discourages the country from participation, and the 
intergovernmental structure in the EU does not help to foster a functioning common EU 
defense policy.  
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I will begin by introducing arguments and hypotheses already brought forward in the existing 
literature. I will then move to the theoretical section in which I will go into further detail 
concerning the dependent variable, the independent variables, the hypotheses as well as the 
main argument. Subsequently, I will give an introduction to the theoretical approaches 
relating to the independent variables. The section on the methodology will follow; 
subsequently, I will analyze the independent variables with regard to their explanatory power 
for the dependent variable. In the conclusion I will present my findings and affirm or reject 
my main argument. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As I have outlined in the introductory section above, I will analyze the role that Germany 
plays in the apparent inability of the EU to develop a common strategy with regard to its 
military actions. In the section on theoretical approaches below, I will explain my dependent 
variable as well as my independent variables in detail; here, I will merely introduce the 
dependent variable and present a number of reasons and arguments that scholars have already 
put forward to explain it.  
The dependent variable in my analysis is the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice with 
regard to military action. In the following, I will introduce attempts of scholars to explain this 
(in-) ability. 
The first argument that some political scientists bring forward is the role that financial aspects 
play in the question of whether to apply military means in a given situation or not. Menon 
(2011) referred to this problem by claiming that the cost factor divides member states of the 
EU when making decisions on military action. The author referred to this as the ‘costs lie 
where they fall’-principle, hinting at the fact that in many cases those member states that are 
supporting an EU mission are to pay for these missions. However, not the entire bulk of costs 
are covered solely by those member states actively participating. Around 10% of the total 
costs for a mission are covered by the entity of the member states of the EU, a formula known 
as the ‘Athena mechanism’. In this scheme, the member states’ financial contributions to a 
mission are calculated on basis of gross domestic product (GDP). Hence, the lion’s share 
(around 90%) of the expenses is being paid for by the willing participants, the minor amount 
is paid by all member states (European Council, 2004; Menon, 2011). Menon (2011) claimed 
that this modus operandi is twice the reason for Germany to be reluctant to using military 
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means in an EU framework. Firstly, it would have to contribute considerably to the costs of 
military operations (as any other willing participant). And secondly, Germany pays most 
under the GDP scale; hence, the country has become more and more sensitive and loath to the 
deployment of military in the EU system. Consequently, Menon (2011) argues, Germany has 
developed high financial doubts about EU military action. 
The second argument that I outline in this section is the aspect of Germany’s aversion to using 
military power with regard to the country’s history and subsequent guilt sentiments. Menon 
(2011), who, as mentioned above, has named financial reasons as one factor for Germany’s 
reluctance, has also referred to the issue of political doubts stemming from the role Germany 
has played in the two world wars. Philippi (2001) supported this view by referring specifically 
to Germany’s role in the Second World War (WWII). After the rule of the Nazi regime came 
to an end in 1945, the Allied forces imposed a relinquishment of military power politics on 
Germany. This aspect, together with a deeply rooted guilt sentiment, accounted for the 
absence of military power to become a distinct feature of German foreign policy (Philippi, 
2001). Schmidt (2011) mentioned a “traditional anxiety about contributing to combat 
operations” (Schmidt, 2011, p. 569). Speck (2011) went a step further in his claim and stated 
that this reluctance has a considerable share in the way that EU foreign policy is being shaped. 
He asserted that Germany has taken on a very pacifist worldview, both proclaimed by the 
public as well as by politicians from the entire spectrum of all parties. Most Germans regard 
war solely as a synonym of ‘senseless destruction’; hence, this view is expressed by 
politicians in equal parts. When Germany was expected to become militarily more active after 
the country’s unification, then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl denied this demand by referring to 
Germany’s past. Twenty years later, at the wake of the Libya intervention, foreign minister 
Guido Westerwelle declared that “war is not a solution”, a standpoint shared by the majority 
of Germans. As it becomes increasingly visible that Germany’s post-war pacifist identity is 
highly present, fellow EU member states—especially the great powers France and UK—need 
to face that Germany’s anti-military view is difficult, if not impossible to burst Speck (Speck, 
2011). Speck’s view is supported by Baumann and Hellmann (2001), who claimed that 
especially after WWII, Germany’s attitudes to as well as practices of war have differed from 
those of other Western powers, a fact that has led to increasing tension between Germany and 
its partners. This abstinence from military action that has dominated German foreign policy-
making after WWII has also been referred to as the ‘culture of constraint’, an approach 
supported by proponents of culturalist approaches (Berger, 1998). They argue that the foreign 
policy of a country is shaped to a large part by its political culture, which in turn may be 
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altered by the occurrence of dramatic political events; in the case of Germany, this would be 
WWII which led to a ‘culture of antimilitarism’. Maull (2000) leaned toward the culturalist 
perception, claiming that Germany’s evolvement as a civilian power is a consequence of the 
lessons learned during and after WWII.  
The third aspect I will refer to in this section is the argument that a common EU standpoint on 
the deployment of military action is difficult due to its complex structure and 
intergovernmental build-up (King, 2005). Cohen’s (2010) rather witty story in a news article 
illustrates this problem in a humorous manner: “President Obama learns with interest that 
Europe now has a phone number. He’s told that, responding at last to Henry Kissinger’s 
famous jibe, the European Union has appointed a President named Herman Van Rompuy 
from Belgium and given him a 24/7 phone line. So, Obama decides to try out Europe’s phone 
number. Henry will be tickled. But the president forgets about the time difference and gets an 
answering machine: ‘Good Evening, you’ve reached the European Union, Herman Van 
Rompuy speaking. We are closed for tonight. Please select from the following options. Press 
one for the French view, two for the German view, three for the British view, four for the 
Polish view, five for the Italian view, six for the Romanian view…’ Obama hangs up in 
dismay.” (Cohen, 2010). Spoken in a more serious tone, the fact that EU policy-making with 
regard to crucial decisions such as military engagement is decided upon via unanimity (as 
opposed to e.g. qualified majority-voting (QMV)) makes it very difficult to arrive at 
decisions. Whether a decision needs to be made in order to determine the actual launch of an 
operation, or to decide upon the duration, the scope or the rules of engagement, all decisions 
need unanimous consent of all member states (Keukeleire, 2009; Matlary, 2006; Ondarza, v., 
2008). In many cases, national governments are in control of foreign, security, and defense 
policy; hence, divergence occurs often and common decision-making becomes an obstacle 
(Krotz & Maher, 2011). The authors continued to state that some aspects are easier to decide 
upon than others; whereas member states agree on aspects such as peacekeeping operations in 
general, the use of military force is a much more sensitive matter that provokes much discord. 
Krotz and Maher (2011) claimed that the reason for a tendency of EU member states to 
disagree on issues of security and defense—with special regard to military deployment—is 
that these aspects lie at the very core of state sovereignty and state identity. Furthermore, 
member states come from different strategic backgrounds. Whereas countries such as France 
or the UK are used to military activism, other countries do not share this experience. Applied 
to the very case of Germany, the country has needed a United Nations (UN) mandate as well 
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as national parliamentary approval for any use of force, even for peacekeeping purposes 
(Wagner, 2005). 
Another very important factor in the realm of intergovernmentalism is the incoherence of 
policies on a national and on an EU level. As Tietje (1997) stated, national policies need to be 
‘vertically coherent’ in order to match foreign policy on the EU level. In many cases, the lack 
of political will is a dominant reason for incoherence; with this, capability gaps remain 
(Rutten, 2002). As Krotz and Maher (2011) stated “in practice, European governments 
oscillate between different degrees of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism in 
pursuit of national or “European” values and interests” (Krotz & Maher, 2011, p. 555).  
These arguments have been brought about by numerous scholars in order to make sense of the 
EU’s inability to find common ground with regard to military deployment. In the following 
section, I will discuss my previously mentioned dependent and independent variables, my 
main argument, my central hypothesis as well as three theoretical approaches that classify 
different understandings of the problem. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAME 
In this section, I provide the theoretical framework of my thesis. I begin by outlining the 
different theoretical approaches that may apply to the independent variables in detail. Firstly, I 
will describe institutionalism. With regard to the framework of the European Union, on which 
my thesis is based, this theoretical approach is highly crucial. Secondly, I will discuss the 
rational choice theory, a way that has been widely used to describe international relations, or 
relations between states or actors. Thirdly, I will discuss constructivism; in this case, I will try 
to apply constructivism, especially with regard to norms and evolved culture. 
I will then continue with the formulation of the variables of my analysis; the dependent 
variable as well as several independent variables. In the previous section I already mentioned 
the dependent variable; in this part, I will enlarge upon it, and add an overview and further 
explanation of the independent variables that may help explain the dependent variable. I will 
then follow with the formulation of my hypotheses; my hypotheses will then be tested in the 
analytical section of this paper. Following from my hypotheses, I will note my main 
argument. 
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Theories of IR – Institutionalism, rational choice theory and constructivism 
Rational choice: 
The rational choice theory started to become part of the political mainstream and by that, 
accepted, in the 1980s. It is generally agreed upon that the rational choice theory relies on two 
key assumptions: rationality and self-interest (Ermakoff, 2010; Hindmoor, 2010). Others, 
such as Coleman (1990), specify the aspect of self-interest and somewhat complete it by 
adding the notion of ‘optimization’. The actors’ goal is to optimize their interests. Rational 
choice theory assumes that one can rely upon actors to act in certain ways that will secure 
their set goals; these goals in turn will be in the actors’ self-interest (Hindmoor, 2010). 
However, as Elster (1986) and Tsebelis (1990) argued, this predictability presupposes that the 
actors’ beliefs and intentions are consistent. If beliefs and intentions are unreliable and 
unknown, the set goals are most likely to be unknown as well. Consequently, it is rather 
impossible to predict the actors’ actions.  
An example that Hindmoor (2010) gives to illustrate the position of how rational choice 
theorists view the world, and in specific political behavior, is the following. If in a given 
country the government decides to cut taxes, and this happens in decisive times, e.g. shortly 
before elections, this is solely related to the governments’ try to increase chances of being re-
elected. Those in power assume that a government that seems to deliver prosperity and the 
prospect of lower financial burdens for the average citizen will be rewarded by being re-
elected. The rational choice theorist would argue solely with these rational deliberations of 
those in power. Aspects such as consumer choice, manageable deficits, crowding out private 
investment, and others, will not be applicable here in the rational choice way of thinking.  
The assumptions of rationality and self-interest have been deployed by other political 
scientists before. One of a number of realist traditions which has its origins in ancient Greece 
assumes that the actions of a state are merely driven by its self-interested drive for power. 
Hence, references to any aspects other than the strife and will for power by states’ leaders 
(which is rarely mentioned by any politician who aims for the sympathy of a country’s 
people), such as the aim of justice or peaceful co-existence are simply ‘cheap talk’ (Dunne & 
Schmidt, 2007). Despite a number of realists who apply the above-mentioned concepts, it is 
mostly rational choice theorists who refer to rationality and self-interest the most (Hindmoor, 
2010).  
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Applied to the case at hand, the inability of the EU to reach a common position on the 
deployment of military troops, I regard the above-mentioned variable of Germany’s aversion 
to using military power due to its high financial burdens as applicable to the rational choice 
theory. Rational choice theory is based on the predominance of the state as the main actor. 
States, or rather those responsible for decision-making within a state, make decisions on basis 
of cost-benefit calculations. As mentioned in the literature review, a large part of financial 
contributions to a military deployment come from those states that are taking part in it. 
Another part is made up of contributions of all member states, which are calculated on basis 
of each country’s GDP. Since Germany has the highest GDP amongst all EU member states, 
the country has to contribute a substantial amount to military deployments by the EU. 
Spending large amounts of money (without getting anything in return, that is) is highly 
undesirable by any state, and hence, not in a country’s best interest (or self-interest). This, 
again, can be referred to as the result of a state’s cost-benefit calculation. If a state’s costs, in 
this case for a military operation, are higher than its benefits, it is very likely for the state not 
to take part in said operation. 
It is important to mention the most crucial criticisms of rational choice theory. Firstly, as 
Friedman (1951) claimed, rational choice theorists argue that in order to judge their theory, or 
any other for that matter, what counts is the accuracy of the theory’s predictions. However, as 
Green and Shapiro (1994) stated, many, or rather the largest part of claims made by rational 
choice theorists, have not been tested empirically.  
Another argument by critics of rational choice theory is mentioned by Hindmoor (2010). The 
author stated that rational choice theory is too simple and disregards complex structures of 
political life and developments. He went on to claim that rationality contains more than 
calculation: Rational choice theory disregards the fact that people act out of habit, jealousy, 
friendship, sympathy or commitment, as well as out of self-interest. This claim is supported 
by Levy (1997) who criticized the expected-utility theory inherent in rational choice theory. 
He stated that experimental evidence suggests that oftentimes people evaluate choices with 
respect to a certain reference point, and that they do not respond to probabilities in a linear 
manner. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) supported this challenge to the expected-utility theory 
by integrating above-mentioned patterns into an already existing theory of risky choice.  
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Institutionalism: 
As Lowndes (2010) stated, traditional institutionalism dealt with the institutions of 
government. As Peters (1999) claimed, there were a number of characteristics that were 
inherent to ‘old’ institutionalism. Firstly, it was normative (because it was concerned with 
‘good government’). Secondly, it was structuralist (because structures determine political 
behavior). Thirdly, it was historicist (because of the crucial influence of history on 
institutions). Fourthly, it was legalist (because law plays an important role in governance. And 
finally, it was holistic (because it was concerned with describing and comparing whole 
systems of government).  
Lowndes (2010) went on to state that the traditional institutionalism had been replaced to 
some extent by a form of ‘new institutionalism’. This new form of institutionalism asserts that 
“the organization of political life makes a difference” (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 747). 
Furthermore, the way in which institutions entail values and power structures is highly 
observed in the new institutionalism. What is of high interest to the case at hand is the way 
that international institutionalists view international relations and politics: they claim that the 
behavior of states is driven by structural constraints, formal as well as informal, of 
international political life (Lowndes, 2010).  
These structural constraints on behavior are very well visible in the EU. The EU’s 
predominantly intergovernmental system lays constraints on the ability of fast and efficient 
decision-making. As Puchala (1999) stated, the intergovernmentalist conceptualization sees 
the national governments, specifically those of the most powerful EU member states, as the 
initiators, promoters, mediators, legislators as well as promulgators of the deepening and 
broadening of EU integration. Hence, if national heads of state and/or ministers of a member 
state—acting as the representatives of a respective country—do not act in concert in order to 
achieve accordance on the EU stage, integration becomes rather difficult. Or, as the author 
continued to claim, “institutionalists readily accept that European integration is structurally 
and procedurally complex” (Puchala, 1999, p. 326). This is especially the case because in 
many policy fields, such as the applicable field of foreign policy, member states of the EU 
have not transferred their entire sovereignty to the EU, and hence, EU decision-making 
reflects very much the primacy of each individual member state (Pollack, 2011). Hence, in 
this intergovernmental system, national interests often outrange EU interests. Since, as has 
already been mentioned, the EU has a considerable amount of members (twenty-seven), and 
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all member states hail from different political, cultural and financial backgrounds, it is 
increasingly difficult to find common ground for unanimous decision-making.  
Moravcsik (1998) has formulated his ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’; this entails a stage in 
which national chiefs of government (COGs) aggregate the interests of their national 
governments as well as their own interests, and forward these interests to the respective 
institutions of the EU. In the second stage, these interests will then be negotiated on the EU 
level; here, the difficulties occur when different opinions and standpoints clash. However, 
Moravscik (1998) claimed that decisions are being taken, and compromises are being 
accepted in some cases in order for the national delegates to prove their willingness to commit 
(‘credible commitment’).  
Institutionalism, institutions within an EU framework and the applied intergovernmental 
decision-making measures apply to two of the above-mentioned independent variables: firstly, 
the independent variable ‘EU’s institutional changes’, and secondly, the independent variable 
‘EU’s intergovernmental structure’. The analysis of these two variables will show if, and to 
what extent institutional and intergovernmental structures might be influencing the inability of 
the EU to find a common standpoint on if and how to use military power.  
 
Constructivism: 
The constructivist theory applied here is of highly normative character. As Guzzini (2000) 
stated, constructivism deals to a large part with the ‘social construct’; how the current 
structure came into being. Constructivism refers to a ‘world of our making’ (Onuf, 1989) in 
which our identity as well as our political culture hail back to experiences from before and 
have been shaped by subsequent developments. Hence, as Parsons (2010) stated, according to 
constructivism, people (as well as states and other political actors) do one thing instead of 
another because of the presence of ‘social constructs’. These constructs can be ideas, beliefs, 
norms, identities or other forms of filters through which actors regard the world.  
Many of the most prominent proponents of constructivism argue that identities, culture and 
political relations are socially constructed. Durkheim (1984[1983]) argued that societies and 
everyone in it are held together by the ‘social facts’ of culture, as opposed to merely by 
‘natural facts’ or ‘material facts’. He went on to state that societies often invent socially 
constructed ideas and beliefs. Similarly, Wendt (1992, 1998) as well as Onuf (1989) saw that 
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rules and identities of international relations are socially constructed. In turn, once identities 
and cultures are constructed, Weber (1978[1922]) argued that developed ideas and culture 
very strongly define what people see as their interests. Arguing from these theses, 
constructivism is a two-way issue: First, people construct their own identities and cultures. 
Once constructed, these very characteristics shape what people are interested in and continue 
to shape their identities. Checkel (1998) supported this idea by formulating two core 
assumptions of constructivism. Firstly, the environment in which agents/states act is social as 
well as material. Secondly, this very setting may provide agents/states with understandings of 
their interests (and may constitute these interests).  
In his article, Parsons (2010) listed three different mechanisms. Firstly, he mentions the aspect 
of socialization. As Checkel (2005) mentioned, this is the most commonly referred-to 
mechanism in current constructivist literature. This mechanism concludes that norms and 
ideas spread in an evolutionary way; it is generated by repeated interaction within groups. The 
author explained that when a group comes together, they act according to the norms that they 
are used to. As interaction increases with time, certain ways of action become ‘normal’ and 
are being repeated. This mechanism does not require certain ‘carriers’ with any authority or 
charisma for the ideas and norms to be spread; furthermore, it is not limited to small groups, 
but rather open to large groups (even as large as the people of one state, to be reflected upon 
below). The second mechanism is persuasion. Here, social norms, ideas and identities are 
shaped by a sort of entrepreneurial people who invent new ideas to sell them to others—these 
people are referred to as ‘carriers’. In this case, social construction relies on explicit 
advocates, a clear distinction from the mechanism of socialization in which social norms 
evolve to a large extent without the consciousness of the involved actors. ‘Carriers’ spread 
their new ideas, and depending on their charisma, the strength of their concepts, as well as the 
fit of the new ideas with the old, are successful. Hence, this mechanism brings about social 
constructs in a relatively manufactured or artificial manner. The third mechanism that Parsons 
(2010) referred to is bricolage. This hails from the French verb ‘bricoler’ which translates to 
‘to tinker’. This mechanism views the world as messy and with overlapping social constructs.  
In the case at hand, the socialization mechanism is mostly applicable. Whilst the constructivist 
theory as a whole applies to the independent variable of ‘Germany’s aversion to use military 
power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’, it may be specified by means of the 
socialization mechanism. Since WWII, the German people as a whole as well as the nation’s 
politicians have developed a pacifist view on its foreign policy strategies. Guilt sentiments 
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stemming from the horrors of WWII have contributed to this, and abstinence from and 
aversion towards the use of military means have evolved (one characteristic of the 
socialization mechanism). Another characteristic of the socialization mechanism is visible, 
still in today’s Germany: the spread of pacifist ideas amongst groups of people. Despite 
disagreement on many political questions that concern the country, the agreement on the issue 
of non-participation in military deployments is rather striking. This is not only true for larger 
groups of people, but rather for most citizens of the country. Hence, the interest of the country 
not to participate in military action can be regarded as the outcome of (still ongoing) social 
developments; or as Wendt (1992) stated: national interests are the result of long-term 
socialization processes.  
 
Variables 
As already mentioned in the introductory part of this thesis, the dependent variable I use is 
‘the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice with regard to military action’. It has long 
been the case that member states of the EU were discordant with regard to decision-making 
on military deployment. In particular, disagreement between the great powers of the EU—
mostly to mention here would be France, the UK and Germany—has been most prominent. 
Hence, in this thesis I aim to find out the predominant reasons explaining this situation. My 
dependent variable is ‘the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice with regard to military 
action’. As I will explain more thoroughly in the methodology section, I will measure the 
dependent variable by analyzing a number of international crisis situations and the action-
taking of the EU’s member states. The dependent variable is accompanied by a number of 
independent variables that may account for the former.  
The first independent variable I present is ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to 
reasons of guilt and the country’s history’. Germany is one of, if not the major player in EU 
politics. It is eminent that Germany’s behavior towards any policy formulated within an EU 
framework has a large impact on the actual policy outcome. It is also often referred to the 
fear, doubts and reluctance of Germany to deploy military troops – both in a national as well 
as in an EU environment. Hence, I will analyze the independent variable ‘Germany’s aversion 
to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’ with regard to its 
explanatory power towards the dependent variable. I define the term ‘guilt’ as “a feeling of 
having committed wrong” (Oxford Dictionary, n. d.). However, the events of WWII date back 
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around sixty-five years, and many of those who were actively involved have since deceased. 
Hence, active guilt is not applicable to the majority of the German people. Consequently, I 
will apply the term ‘guilt by association’. This is defined as “guilt ascribed to someone not 
because of any evidence but because of their association with an offender” (Oxford 
Dictionary, n. d.). In this case the association of the German people exists through the 
association with their country’s history.  
I argue that this independent variable is the major factor to explain the dependent variable, as 
I will formulate in my main argument. 
The second independent variable I will test is ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due 
to its role as the major financial contributor’. As mentioned already in the literature review, 
Germany contributes most under the GDP scale to military deployments of the EU. It is 
therefore possible that Germany has a certain level of reluctance towards using military power 
in order not to have to contribute financially to a large extent. I will also test this independent 
variable with regard to the dependent variable ‘the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice 
with regard to military action’.  
The third independent variable I will analyze is the ‘EU member states’ domestic policies’. In 
this section I will analyze the possibility that the domestic policies of the most powerful states 
in the EU, namely Germany, France and the UK, may have an influence on difficulties to find 
a common EU standpoint on military action-taking. It might have been the case that one 
country faced national elections in the time when a decision was necessary on whether to take 
military action. It might have been the case that national polls indicated the public’s stand on 
military intervention.  
This variable is rather connected to the independent variable on the intergovernmental 
structure and its consequences for EU decision-making, and the institutional development of 
the EU to inhibit such difficult consequences. However, this variable differs to the degree that 
I will analyze national standpoints at specific points of time, namely at the time of the 
respective military engagements.   
The fourth and last independent variable I will test with regard to its explanatory power for 
the dependent variable is the ‘EU’s institutional changes’ that have taken place over the 
course of the last decades. In particular, with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, a 
common foreign policy of the EU started to be built. In the years after the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties followed and further changes 
were added to advance an EU common foreign policy. In the analytical section of this thesis, I 
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will analyze the institutional changes and determine whether these had an influence on the 
above-mentioned dependent variable ‘the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice with 
regard to military action’.  
This independent variable is closely connected to the EU’s intergovernmental structure. With 
regard to decision-making on EU foreign policy, the structure is intergovernmental – in 
contrast to e.g. a supranational system. Intergovernmentalism is insofar desirable by EU 
member states in that a large part of their sovereignty remains preserved. Member states are 
often reluctant to delegate their sovereignty to EU institutions; hence, sensitive policy areas, 
such as foreign policy-making, and especially decisions on whether to deploy military means 
are placed in an intergovernmental framework. In this framework, member states need to have 
unanimity with regard to a decision taken. What is beneficial for the sovereignty of member 
states is in turn an obstacle for EU decision-making. Reliable and especially fast decision-
making is almost impossible. Currently, there are twenty-seven member states, with different 
political, financial and cultural backgrounds. For these twenty-seven actors to agree on any 
topic, let alone a topic as sensitive and contested as military deployment is, without a doubt, a 
great challenge. The institutional changes that have taken place within the EU structure in the 
last two decades were designed to obviate collisions between national and EU-level issues. I 
will analyze whether this goal has been reached with regard to decision-making in foreign 
policy and military issues. 
To summarize, the independent variables I will test are ‘Germany’s aversion to use military 
power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’, ‘Germany’s aversion to use military 
power due to its role as the major financial contributor’, the ‘EU member states’ domestic 
policies’, and ‘the EU’s institutional changes’. As mentioned above, the variables of ‘the 
EU’s institutional changes’ and ‘EU member states domestic policies’ are related to some 
extent. However, they are not applicable in the same manner (as further described above), and 
hence, need to be analyzed separately. The independent variable ‘Germany’s aversion to use 
military power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’ might be related to the 
variable ‘EU member states’ domestic policies’; however, I will analyze not merely 
Germany’s domestic policies, but also those of France and the UK. Furthermore, Germany’s 
domestic policy is not likely to be based purely on the events of the country’s past. Hence, I 
will analyze these two variables separately.  
Above, I have referred to the dependent variable I will use in this paper, as well as four 
independent variables that might explain the dependent variable. As already mentioned, I 
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argue that the often visible inability of the EU to speak with a common voice on questions of 
military deployment is a function of a number of different factors; however, I argue that the 
biggest role here is being played by the aversion of Germany to deploy military power due to 
the country’s history, and therefore, its guilt. Hence, my main argument is: ‘The inability of 
the EU to speak with a common voice with regard to military action is due to several aspects, 
with the largest influence being Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of 
guilt and the country’s history’. 
The following table gives a structured overview of the dependent variable, the independent 
variables, the hypotheses and the main argument. 
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Table 1: Dependent variable, independent variables, hypotheses and main argument 
  Hypotheses 
Dependent variable 
 
The EU’s ability to speak with 
a common voice with regard to 
military action 
 
Independent variables 
 
Germany’s aversion to use 
military power due to reasons 
of guilt and the country’s 
history 
The more present guilt 
sentiments still are in 
Germany, the less likely it 
is for the EU to be able to 
speak with a common 
voice. 
Germany’s aversion to use 
military power due to its role 
as the major financial 
contributor 
The higher the share of 
Germany’s potential 
financial contribution to a 
military operation, the 
less likely it is for the EU 
to be able to speak with 
one voice. 
EU member states’ domestic 
policies 
The more diverse the 
respective member states’ 
domestic policies, the less 
likely it is for the EU to 
be able to speak with a 
common voice. 
EU’s institutional changes The more institutional 
changes aiming for a 
more unified EU foreign 
policy have been put into 
place, the more likely it is 
for the EU to be able to 
speak with a common 
voice. 
Main argument 
 
The inability of the EU to 
speak with a common voice 
with regard to military action 
is due to several aspects, with 
the largest influence being 
Germany’s aversion to use 
military power due to reasons 
of guilt and the country’s 
history. 
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METHODOLOGY 
In this section I will briefly introduce the methodology I use in this paper. As stated in the 
introductory part as well as in the theoretical section, I aim to analyze to what extent 
Germany’s aversion to use military power due to historic reasons influences the EU’s ability 
to speak with a common voice on issues of security and defense. In order to do so, I chose 
five different missions: the Gulf War, the Kosovo war, the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war, as 
well as, most recently, the Libya intervention.  
I chose to take the Gulf War into consideration since it was the first international war after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, it was a war that Germany did not participate in, and hence, interesting for the 
analysis at hand.  
The Kosovo war is important insofar as it marks the first German military involvement after 
WWII. Hence, this case is important to consider and analyze for this paper in order to find out 
whether this German involvement marked a turning point in German military engagement. 
Subsequently, I will analyze whether dedication to or abstinence from military action by 
Germany in the time following the Kosovo engagement does make a difference in decision-
making and finding a common ground in the EU with regard to security issues.  
The war in Afghanistan is crucial to analyze in this thesis due to the anew division between 
the EU’s most powerful states. Whereas France and Germany refused to participate in this 
US-led war, the UK was at its ally’s side to fight in Afghanistan. Hence, a disruption in EU 
foreign policy ideas was visible once more. 
The Iraq war is again an international crisis that highlighted the inability of the EU to get on 
the same page and act as a unit in defense and security questions. Whereas the UK supported 
the US in its fight against Iraq, Germany and France held back and opposed the war to the 
fullest. Again, it is again interesting for my study to analyze what the crucial points were that 
determined the inability of the EU to act in concert.  
Lastly, I will analyze the case of the Libya intervention in 2011. This is the most recent case 
of international disagreement on how to act in a situation of oppression of a people. At the 
same time, the disagreement is not merely international, but splits the large powers of the EU 
again – Germany, France and the UK. Like many times before, Germany seems to be 
involved with the role of the ‘outsider’, the state that tries to stay out of military conflict.  
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All these conflicts represent situations in which international military missions were being 
carried out. These wars were all fought on the international stage, and with the exception of 
the Kosovo war, all operations took place without German military engagement. Why 
Germany did decide to participate in Kosovo will be, amongst other issues, subject of the 
analysis part. Furthermore, the operations that I will analyze (again, with the exception of the 
Kosovo war) signify the conflict among the member states of the EU (as indicated above).   
Furthermore, I consider the time frame when choosing the cases to analyze. The cases of war 
that I will examine in the analysis section below range over a period of around twenty years. 
The long term will make it possible for me to potentially eliminate certain independent 
variables as the cause for the dependent variable. As I will depict further in the analysis, it is 
e. g. possible that changes over time to EU institutions may have had an effect on the EU’s 
ability to act in concert. As I will examine the independent variables, the extended time span 
will be beneficial in making a reliable statement. 
As described above, I will apply the possible independent variables onto the five cases: 
‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’, 
‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to its role as the major financial contributor’, 
‘EU member states’ domestic policies’ and ‘EU’s institutional changes’. With regard to the 
third independent variable mentioned, I will analyze the policies of the EU’s three largest and 
most powerful states: Germany, France and the UK (Moravcsik, 1998). The actions of these 
three states are rather decisive when determining the ability of the entire EU to speak with one 
voice. 
With this approach, I will finally determine whether the main argument I posed can be 
supported or rejected, namely: ‘The inability of the EU to speak with a common voice with 
regard to military action is due to several aspects, with the largest influence being Germany’s 
aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’. 
 
ANALYSIS 
In this part of the thesis, I will analyze the previously presented independent variables on 
basis of several cases of military deployment by EU states (as explained in the section on the 
methodology used in this paper). I will discuss each selected case by giving a short 
introduction of the respective situation, and then apply each mentioned independent variable 
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on the given case in order to conclude which variable was the most dominant regarding the 
issue of the EU’s inability to have a common standpoint on military deployment.  
Since I will focus on the role that Germany plays, it is crucial to stress again that Germany’s 
actions are highly relevant for the actions the EU takes as a whole. Germany is the most 
populous, most influential and powerful member state of the EU, with many options to exert 
pressure on fellow member states. 
In the analysis, I will focus on the independent variable ‘Germany’s aversion to use military 
power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’; I will also consider the remaining 
independent variables. At the end of this section, I will give an overview of my findings.  
 
Gulf War 
The Gulf War broke out in 1990/1991, a very short time after the unification of Germany. In 
this rather difficult (albeit joyous) time, the country was faced with challenges both in 
domestic politics, as well as in foreign affairs. The German government under Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl decided not to take part in military deployments, much to the irritation of the 
country’s international partners. It was argued that the German constitution did not allow for 
so-called out-of-area operations with German involvement; hence, German soldiers did not 
take part in the operation ‘Desert Storm’ in Iraq. It was interpreted that the German basic law 
ruled out any engagement of the German army, the Bundeswehr, with the exception of 
defending territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or in unarmed 
humanitarian operations. An example for such an operation is the 1992-1993 UNTAC 
operation in Cambodia. The government argued that Article 87 a II of the German Basic Law 
stated that armed forces of any sort may be used exclusively in a situation that calls for 
defense unless the very same Basic Law explicitly allowed another use of force. Despite the 
fact that legal experts argued that Article 24 of the Basic Law was legally ground enough for 
collective military action in a NATO and/ or U.N. framework, the government doubted the 
legality of such out-of-area operations. As a consequence, the government expanded the 
competences of the Bundeswehr little by little. In the meantime, German soldiers were 
deployed in several missions; however, all of these missions were even below the level of 
peacekeeping, let alone combat operations. It was argued that Germany’s ‘inactivity’ in the 
Gulf War was largely due to the country’s ‘history factor’ (Philippi, 2001). After WWII, 
Germany became averse to using any sort of military means; this development continued in 
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the decades after WWII and was enforced by both Germany as well as the international 
community (Philippi, 2001). Many other countries demanded the country’s abjuration from 
military action due to fear anything even close to the horrors of WWII might happen again 
(Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993). Germany, in turn, accepted this role, and in the following 
decades became a country with a largely pacifist attitude; not only was this applied, but 
became a natural trait of German foreign policy. By the time of the Gulf War, this attitude 
was so strongly internalized by the German people as well as its political establishment that it 
was an ample reason not to participate militarily (Philippi, 2001). However, the German 
government did send eighteen Alpha-Jets to Turkey in order to support the NATO’s Allied 
Mobile Force in Southeast Turkey in January of 1991. This decision again led to a legal 
debate in Germany, and large parts of the opposition parties criticized this procedure 
(Philippi, 2001). Yet, no military efforts were made by the German military; above, I argued 
that in this case, the abstinence of German soldiers was largely due to attitudes affected by the 
historical traits of the country.  
The hypothesis ‘the more present guilt sentiments still are in Germany, the less likely it is for 
the EU to be able to speak with a common voice’ can be affirmed in this case. 
The second independent variable is ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to its role 
as the major financial contributor’. As argued in the literature review as well as in the 
theoretical part, Germany as the largest country in the EU (at the time of the Gulf War in the 
EC) is the largest contributor to military expenditure. With the abstention from participating 
militarily, Germany saved large amounts of money. The country did, indeed, pay about 
sixteen million D-Mark in order to help finance the ‘Operation Desert Storm’ (Philippi, 2001). 
However, when compared to the costs as paid by the most active force, the US, this number 
looks keenly low: between 1990 and 1991, the US paid sixty-one billion USD for the Gulf 
War (Daggett, 2010). Hence, one may assume that abstinence from taking military action in 
this case may have been due to financial considerations.  
The hypothesis ‘the higher the share of Germany’s potential financial contribution to a 
military operation, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with one voice’ can be 
confirmed in this case.  
The third variable is ‘EU member states’ domestic policies’. As stated above, Germany’s past 
as well as its Basic Law inhibited the country to take part in the Gulf War in 1990/1991. The 
two other major EU (then: EC) powers, France and the UK, did however decide to participate 
(Yost, 1993). Hence, I can state that this case is an example of the inability of the EU (EC) to 
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speak with a common voice due to the different policies of its main actors. The hypothesis 
‘the more diverse the respective member states’ domestic policies, the less likely it is for the 
EU to be able to speak with a common voice’ can be confirmed. 
The fourth variable to consider is the ‘EU’s institutional changes’, or the EU’s institutional 
status at the time of the war. At the time of the Gulf War, the only foreign policy instrument 
present in the EC was the European Political Cooperation (EPC), established in 1970. This 
was initiated by and approved of in the Luxembourg Report of the foreign ministers of the 
then six member states of the EEC. They had agreed that it was important to intensify their 
political cooperation (in addition to economic cooperation) and hence, to have a mechanism 
for conforming their views on issues on the international level (Crowe, 2003). 
The main objectives of this collaboration were three-fold: Firstly, it was to ensure an 
increased understanding on major international problems. Secondly, it was to strengthen the 
member states’ solidarity, and thirdly, to take common action when needed. To fulfill these 
objectives, several measures were taken. Among other provisions, the foreign ministers of the 
six member states were to meet biannually, a Political Committee of member states’ Directors 
of Political Affairs was to meet quarterly, and specialist working parties were established 
(Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). In the course of adopting the Single European Act in 
1986, the EPC was granted treaty status with the objective to implement a European foreign 
policy (Crowe, 2003; Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). 
Despite these efforts, the EPC was working rather ineffectively on the international level due 
to several reasons: It was solely based on intergovernmental conventions; consensus was 
required for every decision, no competences were transferred to the European level and 
European institutions were not granted any formal role (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). 
Consequently, a more effective and drastic foreign policy approach had to be taken. However, 
after the Gulf War, Germany’s demand to develop and establish a common foreign and 
security policy was lacking credibility since Germany had so far taken its German 
Sonderwege (own special ways) (Philippi, 2001, p. 52).  
Since the institutional development with regard to a common EU foreign policy lacked a 
number of facets, I can confirm the hypothesis that ‘the more institutional changes aiming for 
a more unified EU foreign policy have been put into place, the more likely it is for the EU to 
be able to speak with a common voice’. In this case, I confirm that ‘the less institutional 
changes aiming for a more unified EU foreign policy have been put into place, the less likely 
it is for the EU to be able to speak with a common voice’.  
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Summing up, the status of a European common foreign policy, let alone a common military 
standpoint, was rather under-developed. Hence, I can conclude that this underdevelopment 
might well have contributed to the different standpoints of the then EC member states. 
Furthermore, the variable ‘EU member states’ domestic policies’ played a part here. Both 
independent variables concerning Germany, ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due 
to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’ and ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power 
due to its role as the major financial contributor’ did also play large parts in this case. 
 
Kosovo 
The Kosovo war of 1999 is rather crucial in this case – it was one of the major military 
engagements of European countries within the last twenty years and marked the first military 
engagement of Germany after WWII. The situation was as follows: Serbs had entered the 
Kosovo, a province inhabited mostly by ethnic-Albanians, and had started a process of ethnic 
cleansing. The international community was not willing to stand by the sidelines and decided 
to take military action. After Germany’s failure to participate in military deployments in the 
Gulf War and several missions following it, the country’s international partners demanded 
more action and support from Germany. However, deliberations taking into account 
Germany’s exceptional role due to WWII came into play yet again, which brings me to the 
first variable ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the 
country’s history’.  
The idea of German soldiers stationed and intervening in an area that had been occupied by 
Germany in WWII and had suffered largely was distressing to the German public as well as 
its politicians. However, notwithstanding the pressure from the international community and 
in consideration of its increased importance as a global player after reunification, Germany, 
amongst other countries, took military action in Kosovo (Anonymous, 2003). Yet, it is crucial 
to stress the hesitation and doubts of the political actors as well as the German public. 
Politicians were stuck between a rock and a hard place, between ‘nie wieder Krieg’ (‘never 
again war’) and ‘nie wieder Auschwitz’ (‘never again Auschwitz’) (Hyde-Price, 2001). The 
German people were also torn between support for the war and the question of whether to 
deploy German soldiers. In an April 1999 survey, 61% of those questioned thought it was 
necessary for air strikes to be taking place in Serbia and the Kosovo. Merely 30% of those 
who were questioned thought this approach was not necessary, 9% abstained from answering 
(Infratest dimap, 1999a). However, in the same month, German citizens were asked whether 
they would support the deployment of NATO ground forces in Kosovo with involvement of 
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German soldiers. Here, only 26% of those who were questioned answered affirmatively. 68% 
of the respondents were against the involvement of German soldiers, 5% abstained from 
answering, and 1% supported the deployment of ground forces, but without any German 
involvement (Infratest dimap, 1999a). In the following month, German citizens were asked 
the same question again: whether they would support German involvement in the deployment 
of NATO ground forces. The number of those who were in favor of such involvement 
decreased within a month, from 26% in April to 21% in May. 75% were against the 
involvement of German soldiers in such a mission, 2% abstained from answering, and 2% 
were in favor of ground forces in Kosovo, yet without German involvement (Infratest dimap, 
1999b). Hence, it seems like the German people felt the need to act, but felt very reluctant 
towards engaging German soldiers in military deployment. Summing up, the German 
government did decide to take military action for the very first time after WWII; however, the 
events of WWII were still present in the minds of decision-makers and German citizens alike, 
and military support was only given reluctantly. Hence, I can confirm the hypothesis ‘the 
more present guilt sentiments still are in Germany, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to 
speak with a common voice’ although Germany did, reluctantly, participate. 
The following variable to test is related to financial aspects. It is to test whether financial 
considerations played a role when it was time to decide whether to deploy military troops in 
Kosovo. Firstly, Germany did take part in this military operation, and hence, it is not logical 
to argue that financial aspects were a reason for Germany to refrain from sending troops 
(since Germany clearly did not refrain from the operation). Secondly, in the years after the 
Kosovo war, financial aid was provided for continued German assistance in international 
efforts to secure the region. In the years 2007 and 2008 the costs for this totaled around 154 
mio. Euro (EUR) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007). Hence, Germany did pay considerable 
amounts of money, and I reject the hypothesis ‘the higher the share of Germany’s potential 
financial contribution to a military operation, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak 
with one voice’.  
The third variable to apply to this case is ‘EU member states’ domestic policies’. As 
explained above, Germany did participate militarily in Kosovo. The other two large powers of 
the EU, France and the UK, also took part in the military conflict in Kosovo (Rouleau, n.d.). 
Hence, the domestic policies of the most powerful EU member states did not differ, and so, 
did not create any conflict in this case. The hypothesis ‘the more diverse the respective 
member states’ domestic policies, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a 
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common voice’, or rather ‘the less diverse the respective member states’ domestic policies, 
the more likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a common voice’ can be confirmed in 
this case. 
The fourth variable to consider here is again the issue of the institutional development of a 
common EU foreign policy strategy. It is to be expected that the further integration of 
European foreign policy might have enhanced the capability of European states to reach a 
common standpoint with regard to military deployment. Hence, in the following I will give an 
overview of the developments that took place between 1993 and 1999, between the end of the 
Gulf War and the war in Kosovo.  
Stemming from the demand for a shared foreign policy, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Crowe, 2003). Motivations 
for further adjustments were recent incidents on the international level – the fall of the 
communist regimes from 1988 until 1991, the reunification of Germany in 1990, the military 
conflict in the Gulf after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 as well as the begin of the 
Yugoslavian crisis in 1991 revealed the shortcomings of the EPC. The hope was for the CFSP 
to improve these shortcomings by creating an effective and reliable European foreign policy. 
Preconditions for this endeavor were to strengthen European integration, to obtain the ability 
to manage inter-institutional relations and relations between member states and the 
Commission, and to create a common identity at some level (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 
2008). 
However, international influence by means of the CFSP remained limited. Decision-making 
processes stayed intergovernmental, the Commission had a smaller voice than the member 
states. This transferred the CFSP to a second pillar (within the three-pillar structure) with 
different decision-making procedures than applied in the first pillar (Crowe, 2003). Member 
states did not fully support the CFSP and hence, did not provide it with the necessary 
instruments or the institutional framework (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). They were 
faced with obligations vis-à-vis the CFSP, based on their membership in general, the 
respective Presidency, and the representation of the CFSP—and therefore of the EU—abroad 
(Smith, 2000). To underline this problem, Pelinka (2007) depicted the structure of the 
European party system as a supporting factor of CFSP’s difficulties. The European parties in 
the Parliament very much depend on their national parties; hence, if national parties are not 
willing to fully support the CFSP, neither will their European counterparts (Pelinka, 2007). 
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In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam brought about a major qualitative change, namely the 
position of ‘Secretary General / High Representative of the CFSP’ (Crowe, 2003; Keukeleire 
& MacNaughtan, 2008). This creation of a new post was mainly due to the realization that the 
CFSP needed more coherence and stability; a permanent leader was thought to be able to 
deliver these more so than the ever rotating Presidency. A downside, however, was the fact 
that there was very limited information with regard to the level or functions of the new 
position. The post of High Representative of the CFSP was merged with that of Secretary-
General of the Council, and was supposed to simply assist the Presidency – hence, ways to 
influence were limited (Crowe, 2003). 
A further change in terms of foreign policy that came with the Amsterdam Treaty was the 
strengthened relationship between the EU and the Western European Union (WEU). 
Consequently, the EU was more involved in issues such as humanitarian and peacekeeping 
tasks as well as duties in crisis management (‘Petersberg Tasks’) (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008).  
In 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was decided upon at the 
European Council in Cologne, Germany (Crowe, 2003). With this, a military degree was 
added to the CFSP; this before unthinkable development was now happening due to two main 
reasons. Firstly, the EU did overcome the ‘European integration versus Atlantic solidarity’ 
problem; secondly, it got over the ‘Civilian power versus military power’ issue (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 55/56). 
The member states that were mostly concerned with the establishment of the ESDP were 
France, Britain, Germany and Italy (Posen, 2006). 
One of the reasons for the establishment of the ESDP was the EU’s attempt to counterbalance 
US hegemony in global politics; however, many scholars do not see this happening any time 
soon due to the rather ‘soft-balance’ approach of the EU (Howorth & Menon, 2009). Another 
reason for the EU to adopt the ESDP was to tackle security problems on its own, both within 
its territory and close by, as well as in more distant areas (Posen, 2006). 
Hence, the ESDP changed the CFSP insofar as it transformed it from a rather diplomatically 
focused into a more action-oriented actor; this path was supposed to lead to a higher 
credibility of the EU as a whole, both inside and outside its borders (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008).  
Following this line of argumentation that the EU did evolve into a more powerful actor with 
regard to foreign policy, I argue that it is possible that the efforts within the EU and the 
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closing of ranks of single actors into a sort of alliance had an influence on the collective 
military commitment of large EU powers, including Germany, in Kosovo.  
Hence, the hypothesis ‘the more institutional changes aiming for a more unified EU foreign 
policy have been put into place, the more likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a 
common voice’ can be carefully confirmed.  
 
 
Afghanistan 
As a response to the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001, in New York City and 
Washington D.C., the US began its mission in Afghanistan, referred to as ‘Operation 
Enduring Freedom’ on October 7th, 2001. The US was supported by its traditional ally, the 
UK as well as by other EU member states, amongst others France (Global Security, n.d.). 
Germany, however, did not take part in the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. The government 
of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and Alliance ‘90/The Greens under Gerhard 
Schröder did not completely refrain from action; Germany started to send troops to support 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that began their work on January 14th, 
2002 in Kabul. The ISAF is a mission approved of by the UN Security Council, and mandated 
by the NATO. Germany’s claimed goals of this mission were security for Germany, 
humanitarian aid for and reconstruction of Afghanistan as well as the safeguarding of 
development. Until this day, Germany still has troops stationed in Afghanistan; however, not 
once did the government (neither the former nor the current government) deviate from its 
course and officially decided for a military deployment. Germany remains part of the ISAF 
troops, but never supported the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.).  
In the following, I will proceed as I did with the cases discussed above. I will analyze the four 
independent variables with regard to their explanatory power for the dependent variable.  
Firstly, I consider the variable ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of 
guilt and the country’s history’. As mentioned above, Germany did sent troops to 
Afghanistan; however, their purpose was to contribute to peace-building, reconstruction and 
stabilization as opposed to any engagement in the actual war (Bindenagel, 2010). Bindenagel 
(2010) continued to state that the German public is strongly disinclined towards any military 
engagement, particularly in cases of participation of the Bundeswehr. This seems to be 
supported by surveys conducted among the German public, one in 2001 and the other in 2011. 
When asked in November 2001 how the German public viewed the air strikes of the US in 
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Afghanistan, only 50% were of the opinion that it was justified and should be continued until 
the collapse of the Taliban regime in the country. 39% of those who were questioned 
answered that air strikes should be suspended in order to render humanitarian assistance, 6% 
stated that they were principally against the air strikes, and 5% abstained from responding 
(Infratest dimap, 2001). This question, however, only concerned military engagement of 
countries other than Germany. As mentioned before, in early 2002 Germany sent troops to 
Afghanistan in order to support reconstruction measures. Continuously, the German 
Bundestag extended the mandate, so that until this day, German troops are still present in the 
country. In September 2011, the German public was asked whether the German soldiers 
stationed in Afghanistan should end their engagement and be brought back to Germany. 
Concerned with this question on the future of German troops (as opposed to troops from other 
countries) and considering the almost ten-year duration of German engagement in 
Afghanistan, a clear majority of respondents wanted to see German soldiers leave the country 
immediately. More exactly, 66% were in favor of the withdrawal of German troops. 32% of 
the respondents did not answer this question affirmatively, while 2% abstained from 
responding (Infratest dimap, 2011). I argue that this reluctance of the German public towards 
the Afghanistan mission is at least partially due to the events in the two world wars of the 20 th 
century and the subsequent aversion to apply military power and be involved in any sort of 
war. Hence, I confirm the hypothesis ‘the more present guilt sentiments still are in Germany, 
the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a common voice’.  
Furthermore, the public attitude towards the mission in Afghanistan is likely to have 
influenced the national government’s stand on the issue; I will analyze the national policies of 
Germany, France and the UK towards the Afghanistan mission below.  
The second variable to consider here is ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to its 
role as the major financial contributor’. One could assume that Germany’s reluctance towards 
engaging in military operations might derive from the fact that the country’s decision-makers 
aimed at saving costs and hence, abstained from military engagement. Since 2004, the 
‘Athena mechanism’ is in place which constitutes that 90% of a EU-led military operation is 
paid by those states that are participating, and 10% are paid by all EU member states on basis 
of their GDP (see literature review). If the EU would have operated in unity in Afghanistan, 
Germany would have had to pay the lion’s share of the costs: Firstly for participating, and 
secondly, as the country with the largest GDP in the EU. In 2002, Germany had a GDP of 
2.132.200 mio. EUR. Compared to that, France had an GDP of 1.542.927,4 million EUR, and 
the UK’s GDP amounted to 1.710.109,3 million EUR (European Commission, n.d.). Hence, 
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Germany would have paid the largest amount of money to an EU operation in Afghanistan 
after 2004 (since operations are still ongoing, I argue that the ‘Athena mechanism’ would 
have played a role in this case although it was adopted several years after the beginning of the 
war in Afghanistan).  
However, the possibility that this variable was decisive in this case is rather small. As 
described above, Germany did participate in operations, just not distinctly in military 
operations. The German Institute for Economic Research estimated that the ten years of 
German participation in Afghanistan have cost the country seventeen billion EUR. 
Additionally, another five billion EUR are expected to be added to this amount until the end 
of German deployment in Afghanistan in 2014 (Anonymous, 2011c). Combined, the 
Afghanistan operation will have cost Germany twenty-two billion EUR.  
Following from this, it is rather unlikely that financial considerations did play a part for 
Germany’s government (as well as parliament) to decide whether to act militarily in 
Afghanistan. Consequently, I reject the hypothesis ‘the higher the share of Germany’s 
potential financial contribution to a military operation, the less likely it is for the EU to be 
able to speak with one voice’.  
The third independent variable I will analyze is the ‘EU member states’ national policies’. As 
mentioned above, the German governments of the last ten years have emphasized that the 
mission in Afghanistan that involves German troops is purely concerned with peace-keeping 
and rebuilding measures (Packer, 2009). This is related to the fact that the German High Court 
limits the possibility of German troops to be engaged in military operations (as already 
mentioned above). Furthermore, in each case of a Bundeswehr deployment a parliamentary 
vote is needed to legitimize the operation (Bindenagel, 2010). Hence, Germany faces 
hindrances when it comes to deciding whether, and if, how to deploy its troops; Afghanistan 
was and still is no exception to this. Hence, Germany’s national policy with regard to this 
mission was to support reconstruction measures, but to stay out of military engagements.  
France, which traditionally has had much less aversion to the application of military power as 
compared to Germany, did take part in the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. By November 
2001, 2,000 troops had been committed to Afghanistan; of these, 1,200 were navy troops, 200 
were part of the air force staff, 100 were logistics staff, and 500 were military intelligence 
officers (Anonymous, n.d.b).  
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The UK, traditionally a loyal ally of the US, also set out their policy in order to support the 
US in Afghanistan. ‘Operation Veritas’ was founded in order to support the military 
engagement of the US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. The UK supported the US from the 
beginning of the war, sending three Royal Navy submarines, tankers as well as troops. By 
mid-March 2002, around 1,700 British soldiers had been deployed to Afghanistan in order to 
support the US and its allies in their fighting against Al Qaeda (Anonymous, n.d.b).  
Following from the description on the three EU member states’ national policies on the war in 
Afghanistan, I state that indeed the respective positions of the countries might very well have 
been one of the reasons why the EU was not able to speak with one voice in this case. All 
three of the countries did participate in this operation. However, France and the UK 
contributed militarily, while Germany continued its commitment with regard to peacekeeping 
and reconstruction. Hence, I confirm the hypothesis that ‘the more diverse the respective 
member states’ domestic policies, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a 
common voice’.  
The fourth independent variable is the ‘EU’s institutional changes’ and whether they had an 
impact on the inability of a common European standpoint in the question whether to go to war 
with Iraq. The Nice Treaty of 2000 did bring about a change in the structure of the CFSP: 
Formal status was given to the EU Military Committee, as well as the Political and Security 
Committee. The latter was endowed with the responsibility of running the every-day business 
of the CFSP, including the decision-making authority regarding military action (Crowe, 
2003). Although this issue was not talked about as much as about other changes in the 
evolving structure towards a more common foreign policy of the EU, it was without a doubt a 
step towards more integration. Hence, I can carefully exclude the variable of the institutional 
development with regard to EU foreign policy in the case of Afghanistan in my efforts to 
establish the cause for the inability of a common EU standpoint on military action taken by its 
member states and I reject the hypothesis ‘the more institutional changes aiming for a more 
unified EU foreign policy have been put into place, the more likely it is for the EU to be able 
to speak with a common voice’. 
Summing up, I come to the conclusion that neither the variable ‘Germany’s aversion to use 
military power due to its role as the major financial contributor’ nor ‘EU’s institutional 
changes’ have mattered much in the case of Afghanistan, and why EU member states were 
not capable of finding a common standpoint here. Since France and the UK contributed to the 
military deployment, as opposed to Germany that was very clear on stating that it would only 
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contribute to peace-building, reconstruction as well as development efforts, it seems that 
domestic policies have had a strong influence on the inability to get to speak with one voice. 
However, the domestic policies in Germany regarding this issue are very likely to be 
connected to the public opinion. No government acts opposed to public opinion over the 
course of a decade, mainly because of fear to disappoint the public, lose the following 
elections and hence, lose power. Public opinion in Germany, however, is still influenced by 
the traditional pacifist attitude that followed WWII. Hence, I conclude that both the variable 
‘EU member states’ domestic policies’ and ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to 
reasons of guilt and the country’s history’ were decisive with regard to the EU’s member 
states’ inability to speak with one voice in the case of Afghanistan. 
 
Iraq 
The Iraq war, led by the US and supported by a number of states including the UK, laid a 
heavy burden on the efforts of the EU to strengthen a further common foreign policy, 
including common positions on military engagements. In 2003, the US under the Bush 
administration decided to go to war with Iraq; the UK declared its support for its traditional 
ally. However, the other great powers of the EU, France and Germany, were in agreement not 
to support any military action by the US and the UK; this led to a quarrel between the three 
major players of the EU (Anonymous, 2003). Everts and Keohane (2003) supported this claim 
by stating that the Iraq war divided Europe and the EU’s most influential players. Habermas 
and Derrida (2003) went even further by stating that this war made Europeans and their 
leaders strongly aware of the failure of a common foreign policy, since the EU was not able to 
speak with one voice.  
As with the cases described above, I will go through the possible variables and try to detect 
which one is most applicable for the failure of a common standpoint regarding military 
deployment in Iraq by the EU.  
Firstly, I consider the possibility that the independent variable ‘Germany’s aversion to use 
military power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’ was a factor in the process of 
splitting Germany and France from the UK (as well as from Spain) in the question of a war 
against Iraq. It is argued that at the time of the beginning of the Iraq war, Germany still 
retained very strong pacifist tendencies which were rooted in the history of post-war Germany 
(as mentioned several times above). Furthermore, as Dettke (2009) argued, the German 
people re-found their anti-militaristic reflexes after witnessing the horrific images of military 
deployments in the Balkans during the 1990s. The results of a survey carried out among parts 
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of the German citizenry supported this claim: in April 2003, 80% of those questioned were of 
the opinion that the Iraq war was not legitimate; only 14% of respondents thought it was 
legitimate, while 6% abstained from answering (Infratest dimap, 2003). Following from this, I 
can carefully confirm the hypothesis ‘the more present guilt sentiments still are in Germany, 
the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a common voice’. 
The possibility that financial aspects played a role is not clearly deniable. While the war in 
Iraq has lasted much longer than was anticipated by the Bush administration, the US and its 
allies have spent billions of dollars to finance the war. Germany, as a non-member of the so-
called ‘coalition of the willing’ consequently did not have these strong financial burdens. 
However, as with the case of financing the Kosovo war, Germany spent considerable amounts 
of money in order to finance rebuilding and relief projects in Iraq, just not in order to wage a 
war.  
When applying the requirements as laid out in the ‘Athena mechanism’, I conclude that 
Germany would have paid the largest amount to an EU-led operation in this case. In 2003, the 
year of the beginning of the Iraq war, Germany’s GDP was 2.147.500 million EUR. As 
compared to that, the GDP of France was 1.587.901,8 million EUR, and the UK’s GDP 
amounted to 1.646.614,8 million EUR (European Commission, n.d.).  
Hence, I argue that it is possible that financial considerations played a part in deliberations 
whether to go to war and I carefully confirm the hypothesis ‘the higher the share of 
Germany’s potential financial contribution to a military operation, the less likely it is for the 
EU to be able to speak with one voice’. 
The third variable to discuss here is ‘EU member states’ domestic policies’. As discussed 
above, the UK did decide to support its traditional ally, the US, in this war. However, 
Germany and France denied their support. Hence, in this case Germany shared its reluctance 
of using military power with France, as opposed to the UK. Yet, disagreement among EU 
member states prevailed and was to a large part a reason for the EU to be unable to speak with 
one voice; consequentially, I confirm the hypothesis that ‘the more diverse the respective 
member states’ domestic policies, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a 
common voice’. 
The fourth variable to test is whether the institutional development with regard to the 
evolvement of a common foreign policy had an impact on the inability of a common 
European standpoint regarding the question whether to go to war with Iraq. As discussed in 
the section on the war in Afghanistan, the Nice Treaty in 2000 brought about changes in the 
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institutional development of the EU with regards to its foreign policy-making that should have 
furthered the possibility of a common EU standpoint. However, as discussed above, the Iraq 
war brought about differences of opinion between Germany and France on the one side, and 
the UK on the other side. Hence, I claim that a lack of institutional prerequisites was not the 
reason for a common opinion to fail in this case, and I reject the hypothesis that ‘the more 
institutional changes aiming for a more unified EU foreign policy have been put into place, 
the more likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a common voice’. 
 
Summing up, I conclude that in the case of the Iraq war, it is highly doubtful that the 
European integration process in the area of CFSP had any influence on the inability of the EU 
member states to arrive at a common standpoint. Much to the contrary, the developments 
established a basis on which member states would have been able to find their common 
ground. As argued above, financial considerations may have played a part in the decision of 
Germany not to participate in the war. Obviously, different domestic policies were relevant. 
The variable ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the 
country’s history’ is likely to be applicable here, as described in the analysis above.  
 
Libya 
The most recent development, or rather non-development, of a common standpoint of EU 
member states concerning foreign policy and the use of military force has been the case of the 
Libya intervention. When the question arose in the U.N. Security Council whether to use 
force against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi, Germany did not vote in favor of it, but rather 
abstained from the vote (Herf, 2011). However, the UN Security Council decided with ten 
votes in favor and five abstentions—Germany, Brazil, China, India as well as the Russian 
Federation—that member states of the UN that have notified the Secretary-General and acting 
in cooperation with said were to “take all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack” (United Nations Security Council, 2011, Art. 
4). These measures were, most notably, a no-fly zone over Libya as well as an arms embargo 
to be carried out with the help of naval forces (United Nations Security Council, 2011). 
During the voting procedures within the UN Security Council as well as in the subsequent 
military operations, Germany’s fellow major powers in the EU, France and the UK, were in 
full support and showed active participation. When NATO began military operations, 
including naval missions, in March 2011 as authorized by the UN Security Council as 
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described above, Germany withdrew two naval crafts and two naval boats (smaller sized) 
from NATO authority. The crew on all four vessels amounted to 550 soldiers. The German 
government released a statement claiming that Germany was not willing to participate in a 
mission that might possibly turn into a military intervention. Furthermore, the government 
withdrew between sixty and seventy Bundeswehr soldiers that had been deployed in the 
Mediterranean region (Neuerer, 2011). Besides France and the UK, the other states that were 
involved in the military operation in Libya were the US, Canada as well as Germany’s fellow 
EU member state, Italy (Anonymous, 2011a). 
This situation was again proof of the inability of EU member states to agree on a common 
standpoint with regard to foreign policy, in particular with regard to decision-making on 
military deployments (Weiland & Nelles, 2011).  
As I did with the analysis of the other missions, I will analyze the possible reasons for the 
inability to reach a common standpoint in this very case.  
Firstly, I consider ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the 
country’s history’. Many claim that still in the year 2011 Germans are haunted by their guilty 
past and hence, tend to try to abstain from military action whenever possible. As has been the 
case with the military engagement in Kosovo in the end of the 1990s, polls among the 
German population again show their ambivalent relation to military deployments. Whilst 62% 
of those questioned supported the use of military means against the regime of Qaddafi, only 
29% were in favor of the possible participation of German troops (Herf, 2011). The fact that 
Germany rejected even the U.N. resolution, not even a question on possible German 
participation, illustrates the still-existing reluctance of Germany to applying military means -  
even in the most horrific of regimes. Hence, I confirm the hypothesis ‘the more present guilt 
sentiments still are in Germany, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a 
common voice’.  
The second possibility is the potential financial considerations about the burden of German 
involvement in a military strike. In order to determine whether such considerations might 
have inflicted a large burden on Germany financially, I will analyze the costs for those states 
that did participate in the military operation in Libya and paid the highest contributions to the 
mission.  
Reportedly, the US had spent 1.1 billion USD (US Dollar) for the Libya intervention by 
September 2011 (Anonymous, n.d.a); Canada had spent almost 50.89 million USD by mid-
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October 2011 (Dunn, 2011). The expenses of the two major EU member states besides 
Germany, France and the UK, look as follows: France had spent 320 million USD by mid-
October 2011, and the UK had spent 333 million USD by the end of October 2011 
(Anonymous, 2011b; Penny, 2011). 
I assume that Germany’s financial share in this operation would have been large again, as 
described under the ‘Athena mechanism’ that takes into account a EU member state’s GDP 
when constituting its financial contribution to a potential EU military mission. In 2011, 
Germany’s GDP was 2.570.800 million EUR. The GDP of France amounted to 1.996.583,1 
million EUR in the same year, the UK’s GDP was 1.737.089,2 million EUR (European 
Commission, n.d.).  
Considering these numbers, the possibility that Germany’s refraining from participation in 
this mission was due to financial deliberations is rather likely. Consequentially, I confirm the 
hypothesis ‘the higher the share of Germany’s potential financial contribution to a military 
operation, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with one voice’. 
The third variable is ‘EU member states’ domestic policies’. As described above, France and 
the UK were determined to start military operations in Libya. Germany, however, was not 
even willing to vote in favor of military action in the UN Security Council, much less act 
militarily. Hence, disagreement occurred once more among the three most powerful EU 
member states which was an integral part in the inability of the EU to speak with a common 
voice in the case of Libya, and so I confirm the hypothesis ‘the more diverse the respective 
member states’ domestic policies, the less likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a 
common voice’.  
Fourthly, it can be assumed that the institutional preconditions of the EU may not have been 
in order to offer a basis for a common EU standpoint in this case. Hence, I analyze the 
developments of EU foreign policy in the advent of the Libya crisis in the following. In 2007, 
the Lisbon Treaty was signed, coming into effect in 2009, making significant changes to the 
EU’s handling of foreign affairs. The most crucial and obvious change came with the creation 
of the position of ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ 
(currently held by Catherine Ashton). This post combined the positions of ‘High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy’ and the newly established position 
of Vice-President of the European Commission, as well as provided for the holder to chair 
meetings of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council (instead of the rotating Presidency).  
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Furthermore, the Treaty provided a newly founded ‘European External Action Service’ to 
assist the High Representative. It is composed of officials from the Council Secretariat, the 
Commission and the diplomatic services of the member states and is financed from the EU 
budget, rather than from the member states themselves. 
Additionally, the new treaty provided for a President of the European Council, whose duty is 
to represent the EU externally on issues regarding the CFSP, without colliding with the 
position of the High Representative (Avery, 2007). 
As Avery (2007) continued, the Treaty improved the prior system in two main ways. Firstly, 
it obviously reorganized the foreign policy approach of the EU. The pillar system was 
maintained, however, the first and second pillars were brought closer together. Secondly, the 
new treaty brought national and European diplomats closer together with a structure to make 
it easier for them to work side by side. 
The Lisbon Treaty held large opportunities for the EU to develop a more coherent and reliable 
position in international affairs, leading to greater effectiveness and visibility if all member 
states are committed to this project (Avery, 2007).  
Following from this analysis, it is rather unlikely that an improper framework was the (main) 
reason for the disagreement between the largest and most powerful member states of the EU 
with regard to a possible military strike against Libya. Hence, I reject the hypothesis that ‘the 
more institutional changes aiming for a more unified EU foreign policy have been put into 
place, the more likely it is for the EU to be able to speak with a common voice’. 
In this case, Germany’s past as well as financial considerations, and consequential differing 
domestic policies between the major EU member states may have contributed in large parts to 
the country’s abstinence from voting on a military mission in Libya.  
 
Conclusion 
In the sections above I analyzed a number of major military missions that were conducted in 
an international environment. After presenting each mission shortly, I described the view of 
Germany on the respective crisis. Subsequently, I applied the possible variables to the cases, 
as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. I tried to either prove that one (or several) of 
the variables was causing the dependent variable, namely the inability of the EU to formulate 
a common standpoint on EU military engagements. In the following, I shortly resume my 
findings. In order to illustrate them clearly, Table 2 depicts the main findings.  
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Table 2: Main findings 
 Guilt Finances Domestic 
policies 
Institutional 
development 
Gulf War Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Kosovo Yes No Yes Yes 
Afghanistan Yes No Yes No 
Iraq Yes Yes Yes No 
Libya Yes Yes Yes No 
 
 
In the analysis it became clear that the variable of ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power 
due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’ in combination with the variable of the ‘EU 
member states’ domestic policies‘ seems to be the largest influence on the dependent variable 
‘the EU’s ability to speak with a common voice with regard to military action’.  
As Table 2 shows, the guilt stemming from WWII that is still persistent in the minds of 
German citizens as well as politicians alike has been a major reason for the country’s 
decisions taken with regard to military action in the Gulf War, in Kosovo, as well as in the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars. In the case of Libya, it is not clear, however rather likely that the 
pacifist character of Germany has largely contributed to the government’s decision to abstain 
from a vote in the U.N. Security Council.  
As discussed above, the financial aspects did not seem to play a (large) role in the case of the 
Kosovo mission and the Afghanistan war. In the case of the Gulf War, the Iraq War, it is 
indeed possible that financial reasons may have played a part. Finally, in the Libya case, it is 
possible that Germany abstained from voting due to otherwise possible financial burdens.  
Differing domestic policies seemed to have played a role in all missions. This variable is 
closely connected to the variable on Germany’s guilt as well as on the variable on Germany’s 
reluctance due to financial considerations. Germany’s domestic policies have been influenced 
by these variables, and hence, these are interconnected. Furthermore, Germany has played the 
‘outsider role’ in all cases except for the war in Iraq. Hence, it is rather likely that Germany’s 
aversion to using military power due to guilt sentiments as well as financial considerations 
were also imminent to this variable. 
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Finally, I found that the institutional development, or at the time, rather underdevelopment, of 
an EU common foreign policy is likely to have contributed to the fact that states did not all act 
together in the Gulf War. A furthering of EU foreign policymaking might have had an effect 
on the rather consistent position of the main EU member states in the Kosovo conflict. 
However, in the remaining two decades, the development progressed, yet, the positions have 
been very diverse until this day. Hence, I find that the institutional situation has not been a 
contributing factor in the remaining three missions; to the contrary, the institutional changes 
should have worked towards a more coherent foreign and security position of the EU.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have worked towards finding an answer to my research question: “To what 
extent does Germany’s aversion to the use of military power due to historic reasons affect the 
EU’s ability to speak with a common voice on issues of security and defense?”  
I began my research with a literature review, collecting statements and hypotheses that 
scholars and (political) scientists had found for the existing problem of getting to a common 
position on security and defense issues within the EU. I then concentrated on the theoretical 
part of my thesis. I depicted the dependent variable, the independent variables to be tested as 
well as the hypotheses and my consequential main argument. The dependent variable ‘the 
EU’s ability to speak with a common voice with regard to military action’ was to be explained 
by one (or more) of the independent variables, namely: 
1. EU’s institutional changes 
2. EU member states’ domestic policies 
3. Germany’s aversion to use military power due to its role as the major financial 
contributor 
4. Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s 
history 
The main argument I stated in the introductory part of this thesis was stated as follows: 
‘The inability of the EU to speak with a common voice with regard to military action is due to 
several aspects, with the largest influence being Germany’s aversion to use military power 
due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’.  
I moved on to the theoretical discussion of the concepts imminent in the independent 
variables. In the following section I discussed the methodological approach and the reasons 
why I chose the cases as discussed in the analysis.  
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From the methodological section I then moved to the analytical part of my thesis. I discussed 
the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War, as well as the Libya 
intervention as the most recent case. As described above, I gave a short overview of the 
respective case and then applied each independent variable to every case in order to determine 
which of the variables had the highest explanatory power in terms of the inability of the EU to 
find a common standpoint on security and defense.  
In the analysis section I discussed the outcomes of my research and the table containing the 
findings.  
Firstly, it becomes evident that the factor of Germany’s guilt plays the major role when 
determining causes for the inability of the EU to speak with a common voice on issues of 
security and defense. In all cases that I analyzed the guilt factor either definitely played a role, 
or was likely to have played a role.  
Secondly, the aspect of Germany’s financial responsibility is apparent in the case of the Gulf 
War, the Iraq War, as well as the Libya intervention.  
Thirdly, I concluded that the differing domestic policies of the most powerful EU member 
states, Germany, France and the UK, played a part in all missions. Yet, this variable is closely 
connected to the variables ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to reasons of guilt 
and the country’s history’ as well as ‘Germany’s aversion to use military power due to its role 
as the major financial contributor’, since Germany’s domestic policies are largely influenced 
by these factors. In all cases except the war in Iraq, Germany has played the part of the 
‘outsider’, hence, the country that acted contrary to the other main actors (France and the 
UK). Consequentially, it is likely that the two afore-mentioned variables with regard to 
Germany played into the variable of ‘EU member states’ domestic policies’ to some extent. 
Lastly, the aspect of the EU’s institutional development on security and defense as well as the 
EU’s intergovernmental structure did not seem to play a decisive part in the explanation of the 
EU’s inability to reach common ground in questions of security and defense either. The 
development of institutions steering EU foreign policy, and hence, decision-making on 
military deployments was designed to bring member states and their standpoints closer 
together; however, the opposite was the case. 
It is safe to say that Germany’s guilt stemming from WWII is still an aspect largely 
determining Germany’s position towards the use of military power. Consequently, the EU’s 
decision-making processes with regard to a common voice on defense and security issues are 
often inhibited and a common ‘foreign policy culture’ can hardly develop. However, other 
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factors considered above play important roles as well. I found that the inability of the EU to 
find a common ground in questions of defense and security is a mixture of different 
theoretical approaches: it is partly rational, partly institutional, and to a large part 
constructivist. Hence, I can confirm my main argument as stated in the beginning of this 
thesis: ‘The inability of the EU to speak with a common voice with regard to military action is 
due to several aspects, with the largest influence being Germany’s aversion to use military 
power due to reasons of guilt and the country’s history’. 
 
Outlook 
The most recent case I have analyzed in this thesis is the intervention in Libya that took place 
in 2011. However, very current international events do not seem to give reason for hope with 
regard to a common EU standpoint on military action-taking. The crisis in Syria seems to 
bring about a continuation of European disagreement in questions of foreign policy and the 
application of military power. The current potentate of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, is committing 
acts of appalling violence against his own people. The international community has been 
discussing if and how to try to deter the Syrian president from continuing his actions. From an 
EU perspective, France and Germany are, again, the focus of attention in this case. Newly 
elected French president Nicolas Hollande proclaimed in May 2012 that he would not rule out 
the option of taking military action in Syria under the condition that such an intervention 
would take place under a mandate of the UN (Anonymous, 2012). The German government 
gave an immediate reaction, stating that a military intervention in Syria is not an option for 
the country to consider (Anonymous, 2012).  
One year after the Libya intervention, the EU and primarily its most powerful actors face 
another obstacle in reaching a common standpoint on foreign policy issues and military 
deployment. The main reasons for the continuing inner-EU conflict have been reflected upon 
in this thesis. Whether the EU will be able to assume its responsibility and start acting in 
concert with regard to foreign policy issues remains to be seen.  
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